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Herein, I analyze a construction which Levin and Rappaport-Havov [1995], fol-
lowing Simpson [1983], term ‘fake reflexives’, and why this construction is li-
censed with unergative resultatives but not with unaccusative resultatives.
(1) a. * Dora shouted hoarse...
b. Dora shouted herself hoarse...
c. * Dora shouted herself
[Levin and Rappaport-Havov, 1995][p.35].
However, the resultatives of unaccusative verbs neither require nor license fake
reflexives.
(2) a. The river froze solid. LRH [p.39]
b. * The river froze itself solid.
Levin and Rappaport-Havov [1995] offer the Direct Object Restriction, given be-
low, as the chief predictor of resultative behavior.
Direct Object Restriction...“a resultative phrase may be predicated
of an immediately postverbal NP, but may not be predicated of a
subject or of an oblique compliment”[Levin and Rappaport-Havov,
1995][34]
From the DOR, Levin and Rappaport-Havov [1995] argue that the unergative fake
reflexive as a ‘illegitimate’ placeholder generated solely for the purpose of receiv-
ing secondary predication. However, I illustrate that the Direct Object Restriction
does not apply to all fake reflexives (what I term ‘directive fake reflexives’) and
is epiphenomenal from constraints on causatives on other cases (for what I term
‘adjectival’ or ‘secondary predicative’ fake reflexives). Then, I explore an alter-
native, in which the ‘fake’ reflexive is not only a legitimate argument, but more-
over, an agentive ‘actor’, in the sense of Kallulli [2006]. As such, the analysis
rehabilitates the fake reflexive argument as an important thematic and aspectual
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participant, while congruent with current thought in semantics and the Minimalist
Program.
Four desiderata and three hypotheses
First, Hornstein [2000], Kayne [2001], Zwart [2002] advocate the reduction of
the Binding Principles to the Copy Theory of Movement. Second, if movement is
leftward, as is generally believed in the MP, it is incongruent with the account that
the external argument of unergatives rightward binds (moves) into secondary pred-
ication. Third, the Universal Theta Alignment Hypothesis (UTAH) [Baker, 1988].
The project here is concerned in many cases with whether Agent and Theme are
sufficiently grain-sized for morphosemantic theory (short answer: no). In deriv-
ing multiple finer-grained features from these θ roles, we will want to maintain
the UTAH, if possible. Finally, from lexical semantics: in evaluating causative
unergatives, we want to explain any variation in lexical sense, meaning, or va-
lency in a principled fashion. To that end, I have drawn upon the ‘root’ concept
from Distributed Morphology, in an attempt to keep correspondences between
roots and verbal heads as stable as possible.
(3) Narrow Syntax
a. [the horse [vDO raced] PP past the barn ].
b. [v[?] raced [the horse [vDO ] PP past the barn]. Head Movement
c. [the horse [v[?] raced [the horse [vDO] PP past the barn]. COPY
d. PF–[the horse [v[?] raced [itself [vDO] PP past the barn].
In the derivational sketch above, we utilize one instance of COPY, one instance
of Head Movement, and the theory of the VP shell to capture what I term loca-
tive fake reflexives. Even this relatively simple syntatic starting point launches us
into some much more thorny semantics issues, prompting the following hypothe-
sises.
• Hypothesis 1: The appearance of the fake reflexive in a small clause is
epiphenomonal from a relationship between initiation and delimitation, and
has less to do with secondary predication.
• Hypothesis 2: If vDO is in fact the correct light verb in a-c, then ‘itself’
should be assigned a θ-role of agent (or Actor, to use Kallulli [2006]’s term).
• Hypothesis 3: The identity of the upper light verb in c. is vCAUSE , or
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VOICE, and it assigns a θ role of Causer.1
Fake reflexives and causative unergatives as telic structures
Taken together, hypothesises 2 and 3 argue for a dually-agentive analysis of fake
reflexives. From 3, it would seem that fake reflexives are a subtype of causative
unergatives, as described by Stevenson and Merlo [1997] and Levin and Rappaport-
Havov [1995].
(4) a. The soldiers marched to the tents. LRH [p.111]
b. The general marched the soldiers to the tents. LRH [p.111]
(5) a. The horse jumped over the fence. LRH [p.111]
b. The rider jumped the horse over the fence. LRH [p.111]
(6) a. The mouse ran through the maze. LRH [p.111]
b. The experimenters ran the mouse through the maze. LRH [p.111]2
Folli and Harley [2006] claim that the Cause and Activity subevents are temperally
concomittant, but that “it isn’t necessarily the case that the agent’s action has to be
an instance of the motion described by the verb” [146]. The general is potentially
marching in a. above, but could equally be stationairy; in b., the horse is jumping,
not the rider, and finally, in c., the mouse is running, not the experimenter. In
general, the causative unergative construction exhibits both thematic and aspectual
ideosyncracies.
First, the internal argument mostly corresponds to the Dowtyian role of proto-
Theme, but possesses a Dowtyian proto-Agent aspect of movement, and in fact, it
is repectively, the soldiers, the horse and the mice that are the Marchers, Jumpers
and Runners. Herein, I attempt to capture systematic correspondence between
variation in θ-role presentation and a particular root (aka verbal alternation), by
dividing the Dowtyian proto-Agent criteria among distinct θ roles of Causer and
1Thanks due to more than a few people for discussions regarding this project, including Marcin
Morzycki, John Hale, Michael Putnam, Greg Johnson, Ben Johnson, and Matt Kanefsky. All
numbering on examples is mine.
2Ritter and Rosen [2000] presents an account of these b. examples, arguing for an analysis of
the internal argument as Theme and the external argument as Agent. This thematic description
accords to most of the Dowtyian criteria, but at the same time seems problematic, as in the b. ex-
amples, above, the general, the experimenters, are relatively Agentive, possessing three of the four
Dowty proto-Agentive properties, but crucially, do not perform actions of running or marching;
rather, it is their Theme position that corresponds best to the sole argument of unergatives.
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Actor. Regarding the Causer argument, LRH citing Cruse [1972] and Reinhart
[1991], argue that “the ‘cause’ argument in such causatives can only be an agent
in the true sense, never an instrument or a natural force”[Levin and Rappaport-
Havov, 1995]
(7) a. * The downpour marched the soldiers to the tents.
b. * The tear gas marched the soldiers to the tents.
(8) a. * The lightening jumped the horse over the fence.
b. * The firecracker jumped the horse over the fence.
c. * The whip jumped the horse over the fence.
Congruent with the hypothesis that fake reflexives are causative unergatives, and
thus, ‘valency-increased’ by V OICE, weather events and instruments are not
eligible External Arguments in the fake reflexive construction, but can appear
intransitive reflexive constructions.
(9) a. * The geyser gushed itself dry.
b. * The volcano erupted itself apart.
c. * The doorbell buzzed itself broke.
d. * The firecracker exploded itself apart.
(10) a. The doorbell unstuck itself.
b. The firecracker/the volcano blew itself apart.
Also, caused unergatives require explicit endpoint [Levin and Rappaport-Havov,
1995], as do fake reflexives3.
(11) a. The general marched the soldiers to the tents. [LRH p. 111]
3Folli and Harley [2006] identify what they claim are atelic path-PP compliments that satisfy
the causative manner-of-motion requirements, as indicated below.
(1) a. John waltzed Matilda around and around the room for hours.
b. John walked Mary along the river all afternoon.
c. John ran the dog up and down the path for hours.
d. John jumped the horse back and forth across the ditch for 30 minutes. [p. 125]
Although the for-an-hour result is often taken to be diagnostic of atelicity, it seems likely here
that they are in fact coerced by the for-an-hour PP from a telic reading to an iterative one.
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b. The soldiers marched themselves to the tents.
c. ?? The general marched the soldiers. [LRH p. 115]
d. ? The soldiers marched themselves.
I argue that this relatedness of external argument requirements and endpoint re-
quirements for causative unergatives and fake reflexives reflects telicity prereq-
uisites for causation in V OICE. As such, I argue against the notion that fake
reflexives exist solely to ensure secondary predication (DOR), but instead for an
aspectual explanation, that causation of unergatives requires telos, and the nec-
essary locality of the endpoint and the agentive fake reflexive is conducive to
secondary predication via control in some, but crucially, not all fake reflexive
structures. As such, I observe that fake reflexives can be divided into three types:
path-locative, prepositional, and adjectival fake reflexives resultatives, as shown
in the next example.
(12) a. The Green Lantern raced himself over to the liquor store.
b. * The Green Lantern raced himself.
(13) a. The Green Lantern drank himself to sleep.
b. * The Green Lantern drank himself.
(14) a. The Green Lantern drank himself sick.
b. * The Green Lantern drank himself.
Interestingly, Williams [2007] points out that true secondary predication can never
position a means adverb after the means predicate.
(15) a. The Green Lantern raced himself quickly over to the liquor store.
b. The Green Lantern drank himself quickly to sleep.
c. * The Green Lantern drank himself quickly sick.
d. * The Green Lantern drank himself.
From this, I contend that secondary predication is not the determinant of fake
reflexivity, if this subset of fake reflexives derives from simple vDO verbs with
PP-path complements, as in the next example.
(16) a. The Green Lantern raced himself over to the liquor store.
b. The Green Lantern raced over to the liquor store.
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By extension, I argue that fake reflexives are licensed only by causativized unerga-
tives. By assuming the reduction of Binding phenomena to Copy Movement, in
conjunction with the bifurcated v hypothesis, accounts for the ‘fake’ of fake re-
flexives; the reflexives of valence-increased unergatives in fact correspond best to
external arguments of standard unergative verbs. Motivating the distinction be-
tween the locative fake reflexives and the predicative fake reflexives would seem
initially to threaten the analysis, specifically by threatening Hypothesis 2, the no-
tion that secondary predication is insufficient to motivate fake reflexivity. At this
point, I return to my argument that causation motivates the fake reflexive, which
is in turn able to leverage secondary predication, if it is present, by control.
Analysis
The following structure for the causative unergative renders the observation that
although the horse, semantically, should be the agent of the racing event, it would
superficially appear to be the internal argument of the verb, and Batman would
appear to be the external argument. V OICE incorporates v+DO , allowing for the










In the following examples, I respectively depict the locative, prepositional, and
adjectival fake-reflexive structures.







over to the Quality Dairy








b. Batman drank himself into a stupor.
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(19) a. VOICEP







b. The Flash danced himself sick.
Here, I do not argue for secondary predication in locative fake reflexives, but
rather, direct event modification by the locative. However, for predicative fake
reflexives, I argue for secondary predication by the bare AP, via control. An ad-
vantage of the syntactic analysis above is that it explains a parallel between in-
transitive and transitive resultatives. Generally, only the transitives which do not
alternate with unaccusatives can take a resultative small clause. Kratzer [2005]
notes that many alternating transitives, particularly unaccusatives, what appears
to be a secondary predication is actually adverbial, and the secondary predication
account herein straightforwardly follows from Krazter, as the theme ‘himself’
raises from an impoverished XP for case.
(20) a. The Flash swept the floor.
b. The Flash swept the floor clean.
(21) a. The Flash baked the cookies.
b. * The Flash baked the cookies burnt.
If transitive unaccusatives are taken to be delimited, then the observation [Ritter
and Rosen, 2000] that double event delimitation is untenable then the lack of re-
sultatives for unaccusatives follows readily. This potentially explains an effect in
Volpe [2004]: eat-type unergatives must take an unaffected theme in the resulta-
tive.
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(22) She ate the bowl/*rice empty [p.13].
If an event cannot be delimited twice, I assume the atelic 21b. structure as a com-
ponent of resultatives as a whole, with the internal argument controlling into the
XP. I take it then, as no accident that the simple causative unergative structure
“John raced the horse” and the transitive “John swept the floor” share both telicity
and transitivity. The DOR seems upheld, but is epiphenomenal: a structure can
be made resultative only if it is atelic and possesses an argument affectable by the
Means predicate, at which point the whole event structure of the Means predicate
is incorporated into a more complex event along with the Result predicate, as I
outline in my semantic analysis.
Adverb evidence
The analysis so far, for caused unergatives, locative fake reflexives, and predica-
tive fake reflexives is doubly caused, and tri-eventive. Typically, the ‘almost’ test
produces ambiguities with a number of readings equal to the number of events,
with each reading respective, it has been argued, to the adverb’s attachment and
subsequent scope over a particular subevent. The following examples apply the
‘almost’ tests to the sentence in 8a. above, representing continuations consistent
with the different readings.
(23) Batman almost raced the horse across the barn...
a. ...but the Dark Knight decided instead to finish for the day, returning
to the Batcave.
b. ...but the horse refused to budge.
c. ...but while the horse was galloping, it threw a horseshoe and fell.
The readings above are best understood as discrepancies in sub-event initiation
and culminativity: in the first reading, causation never initiates; in the second
reading, causation initiates but activity does not; in the third reading, causation
and activity each initiate, but never culminate in the event of being across the
barn.
The following paradigm shows the ‘almost’ test applied to unergative fake reflex-
ives, with different continuations indicating the different readings, to be explicated
below.
(24) Upon losing the Lantern ring, John Stewart almost drank himself sick....
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a. ...but instead he went right home and went to bed instead.
b. ...but after hesitating, he went home and went to bed instead.
c. ...but Wonder Woman came by the saloon and lassoed him in the mid-
dle of his beer.
Similar to before, the readings in 8 can be disambiguated by decomposing the
initiation and culmination of subsequent sub-events. In the reading in 8a., the
causing sub-event does not initiate. In the reading in 8b., the causing sub-event
initiates, but the drinking activity does not initiate. In 8c., the drinking activity
initiates, but the event of becoming sick does not culiminate. If the face inter-
pretation of these results is valid, it would seem then that the ‘almost’ test is not
cross-contaminated by reflexivity, because ‘almost’ attachment generates ambi-
guities in culmination and not causation, or put more generally, it is more directly
sensitive to the event generated by the functional heads involved, and not sensitive
at all to the causative and affected arguments. Folli and Harley [2004] note the
following evidence from Higginbotham.
(25) a. John sat his guest on the floor on purpose.
b. John sat his guest on the floor slowly.
While the adverb ambiguity evidence, as well as the paradigm above, argue for
the trieventive analysis, it only indirectly argues for the agency of the internal ar-
gument. A possibility for more direct evidence would be to leverage an agent-
oriented adverb with syntactic positioning. As head movement is seen, upon
derivational considerations, to be a PF phenomenon [Harley, 2002], head-moved
verbs should retain their compositional semantics, and therefore, scope proper-
ties.
(26) a. I baked the cookies deliberately to a crisp.
b. I marched the soldiers grumpily into the tents.
c. I marched myself grumpily into the tent.
d. I marched the soldiers carefully sick.
e. I marched myself carefully sick.
Lower scope of the adverb does not seem available in the active voice. Another
possibility, suggested to me by Marcin Morzycki (personal communication), is
to exploit passive-sensitivity of certain agent-oriented adverbs. If the structures
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here are dually agentive, agent-oriented adverbs should present ambiguities for
the passives.
(27) a. The soldier was deliberately marched across the field.
b. Who was deliberate?
c. The general
d. ? himself
(28) a. The soldier was grumpily marched across the field.
b. Who was grumpy?
c. The general
d. himself
For the class of adverbs represented by ‘grumpily’, such an ambiguity does seem
available.
Telicity requirements in causative semantics
Here, I assume that a single Voice head projects a Causer theta-role, and applies
Event Identification following Kratzer [1996], and that a single v head projects an
Actor θ-role, but that contra Kratzer [1996], this individual is composed through
Functional Application4 . Such an analysis attempts to explain why V OICE
must take a change of state predicate, but, contra Folli and Harley [2006], I lo-
cate these requirements in the semantics, for two reasons. First, Kratzer [2005]
notes the problems inherent in locating a telicity feature in the syntax. Moreover,
Folli and Harley [2006]’s postulated syntactic structure seems quite non-local, as
heads higher than v require v itself to have a certain XP complement. As such,
here I revisit the notion of Event Identification as External Causation [Pylkka-
nen, 2000], and attempt to explain change-of-state requirements on causation as
artifacts of how causatives apply Event Identification. The following is a naive
neo-Davidsonian analysis of secondary predicative fake reflexives.
(29) a. The Flash danced himself sick.
b. ∃e1∃e2∃x∃y∃s(F lash(x)∧Causer(x, e1 )∧Cause(e1 , e2 )∧F lash(y)∧
Actor(y, e2 ) ∧Dance(e2 ) ∧ Cul(e2 , s) ∧ Theme(y, s) ∧ Sick(s))
4Notably, on such an account, the external argument of unergatives remains ’unsevered’, and
only transitives formed with VOICE (externally-caused alternants of intransitives) have a severed
external argument, following to some extent, Pylkkanen [2000], the consequences of which I take
up in forthcoming work.
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This naive neo-Davidsonian analysis realizes resultatives as decomposed into mul-
tiple sub-events, as identified by the event variables e1, e2, and s. Williams [2007],
however, gives us reason to believe that a decomposition of this type is not en-
trirely accurate, as indicated by the following adverb evidence.
(30) a. Ozzy sang his throat hoarse by not resting between shows. [Williams,
2007, p.4]
b. ∃ec∃em∃erK(ec, em , er )∧sing(...)(em)∧hoarse(...)(er )∧Pat(ec , t)∧Ag(ec , o)...
[Williams, 2007, p.4]
The adverbial ‘by not resting between shows’ cannot apply solely to the Singing
(em) or the Hoarse (er) eventualities, but rather, a complex third event derived
from them (ec). Extending Pylkkanen [2000], I propose that Pylkkanen [2000]’s
[θ, V OICE]5 morpheme in Standard English (and Pylkkanen’s Type I languages)
bundles two instances of Event Identification [Kratzer, 1996], the latter of which
requires a result state in the semantics, agnostic to the syntax of control.
The first lambda conjunction, located in CAUS, conjoins the means event and the
result event, capturing Williams [2007]’s Outside Role Analysis of resultatives.
The latter lambda conjunction is Event Identification for the Causer θ role. The
bundling of two lambda conjunction rules into the same morpheme predicts that
for Type I languages, Event Identified External Causatives require change of state
(but not vice versa).
(31) a. Resultative Event Identification [θ, CAUS]
b. θ : λxλeCAgent(x, eC) ∧M(eC ... ∧R(eC)...)
λxλeAgent(x, e) CAUSE: λeCM(eC) ∧R(eC)...
λeMM(eM )... λeRR(eR)....
This analysis at first appears quite unorthodox, but on an initial view at least it
seems defendable that the type of concommitant relationship between the Means
and the Result event which Folli and Harley [2006] observe can be captured by
conjoining them to a same complex event variable. This should derive not only
5For clarity, I term the larger component morphemes as θ and CAUS, and the conglomerate
morpheme as V OICE.
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the Williams [2007] observations, but may also address another puzzle: why lexi-
cal causatives, at least to my knowledge, cross-linguistically do not seem capable
of productively taking transitives derived from unergatives to produce ditransi-
tives.
(32) a. * John drank Batman a beer.
b. * John walked the Joker a mile.
The ungrammaticality of the following does not immediately follow from tra-
ditional Neo-Davidsonian analyses which conjoin and preserve predicates, but
seems more congruent with analyses which bind off or conjoin event varaiables.
Conclusion
Throughout, I have analyzed fake reflexives not as a an escape mechanism for
the syntactic DOR, but as a subset of causative unergatives. We saw that fake
reflexives restrict their external argument to an animate Causer, and that they re-
quire endpoint. Both of these phenomena classically hold over causative unerga-
tives as well. In doing so, we explained a certain type of valence-increase and
sense-changing mechanism, employing attested Minimalist and semantic tools to
simplify the syntactic analysis of some resultatives.
However, the hypotheses here appear to hold, but at the cost of a more curious
looking vP shell, a newer set of θ roles (which may not be such a bad thing), and
apprarently more powerful PF operations.
Not only that, the idea that “myself” can be an Agent (actor), and moreover, the
specifier of v, is bizarre! However, we should actually expect anomalies of pre-
cisely this type in the MP; the Minimalist division of labor for movement between
independent PF and LF/CI interfaces applied to the Binding Principles in the form
of the Copy Theory of Binding in turn predicts the divergence of semantic-syntatic
phenomena (θ roles) and syntatic-phonetic aspects (Case).
References
M.C. Baker. Incorporation: A Theorty of Grammatical Function Changing. Uni-
versity Chicago Press, 1988.
D. A. Cruse. A note on english causatives. Linguistic Inquiry, 67(3):522–528,
1972.
Kansas Working Papers in Linguistics, Vol. 30 (2008), p. 118
R. Folli and H. Harley. Flavors of v: Consuming results in Italian and English. In
R. Slabakova and P. Kempchinsky, editors, Aspectual Inquiries, pages 95–120.
Kluwer, 2004.
R. Folli and H. Harley. On the licensing of causatives of directed motion: Waltzing
matlida all over. Studia Linguistica, 60(2):121–249, 2006.
H. Harley. Why one head is better than two: Head movement and compound-
ing as consequences of merge in bare phrase structure. In Arizona Linguistics
Colloquium Series, 2002.
J. Higginbotham. Location and causation. University of Oxford.
N. Hornstein. Move! A Minimalist Theory of Construal. Blackwell, Oxford,
2000.
D. Kallulli. A unified analysis of passives, anticausatives and reflexives. In
P. Cabredo Hofherr. O. Bonami, editor, Empirical Issues in Syntax and
Semantics, volume 6, pages 201–225, 2006.
R. Kayne. Pronouns and Their Antecedents. Blackwell Series on Generative
Syntax. Blackwell Publishers., 2001.
A. Kratzer. Severing the external argument from its verb. In J. Rooryck and
L. Zaring, editors, Phrase Structure and the Lexicon., pages 109–137. Dor-
drecht (Kluwer), 1996.
A. Kratzer. Building resultatives. In C. Maienborn and A. Wo¨llstein-Leisten, ed-
itors, Events in Syntax, Semantics, and Discourse., pages 177–212. Niemeyer,
2005.
B. Levin and M. Rappaport-Havov. Unaccusativity: at the Syntax- Lexical
Semantics Interface. MIT Press, 1995.
L. Pylkkanen. Representing causatives. In B. Jackson and T. Matthews, editors,
Proceedings of SALTX (Semantics and Linguistic Theory), 2000.
T. Reinhart. Lexical properties of unergativity. In Mid-America Linguistics
Conference, 1991.
E. Ritter and S. Rosen. Event Structure and Ergativity. CSLI, 2000.
J. Simpson. Resultatives. In L. Levin, M. Rappaport, and A. Zaenen, editors,
Papers in Lexical-Functional Grammar. Indiana University Linguistics Club,
1983.
S. Stevenson and P. Merlo. Lexical structure and parsing complexity. Language
and Cognitive Processes, 12, 1997.
M. Volpe. Affected object unergatives. Snippets, (8):12–13, 2004.
A. Williams. Objects in resultatives. Draft. In Review, 2007.
Kyle Wade Grove: grovekyl@msu.edu
Kansas Working Papers in Linguistics, Vol. 30 (2008), p. 119
